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Abstract The object of this paper is to place allocation mechanisms into a
framework of Emission Trading Systems and thereby to establish a typology. It
analyses how various assignment mechanisms deal with issues such as price
determination, allocative efficiency and environmental considerations in a static
and dynamic economy model. It analyses how allocation mechanisms are to be
ranked and whether they serve the attainment of the general equilibrium. First
the paper examines how market-based allocation mechanisms (auctions) perform
in light of the above issues. Second the paper distinguishes between the two
types of administrative allocation mechanisms: (1) financial administrative allo-
cation mechanisms, combining payment schemes with bureaucratic expertise, and
(2) free administrative allocation mechanisms, based inter alia on industrial
policy considerations and on passed emission records (grandfathering). In par-
ticular, the value added of relative performance standards, which are for example
included in the ‘‘Performance Standard Rate’’ (PSR) Emission Trading System,
are examined as a means to provide allowances. The overall finding is that in a
closed static economy and in the presence of an efficient trading market, dif-
ferent allocation methods produce equally efficient outcomes in allocative and
environmental respects. With regard to an open dynamic economy, the impact of
initial allocation mechanisms resembles those of a static closed economy. In such
an economy the upper limit to the internalisation of negative externalities is
given by operator’s costs of environmentally harmful relocation and hence the
cost burden placed upon operators is crucial. Auctions and financial adminis-
trative allocation mechanisms perform less well than free administrative mech-
anisms. Relative standard base mechanisms, constituting an important element of
the PSR Emission Trading System, perform better than grandfathering schemes
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because they take into account abatement possibilities of industries, minimise
stranded costs and do not give rise to time shifting of abatement projects. It is
therefore concluded that allocation mechanisms merit more attention than the
discussion relating to capped trade and trade without a cap.
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1 Introduction
Since 1991 the European Commission has taken various climate related initiatives
to limit CO2 emissions and improve energy efficiency. Measures included the
promotion of electricity from renewable energy, voluntary commitments by
carmakers and proposals on the taxation of energy products. In order to meet the
European Greenhouse Gas1 reduction goals committed under the Kyoto Protocol,2
the European Commission launched the European Climate Change Program
(ECCP). The ECCP aims at identifying and developing all necessary elements to
implement the Kyoto Protocol,3 and to attain the committed average annual
reduction of 8% below 1990 levels during the years 2008–2012 (binding upon the
old 15 EU Member States).
One element of the ECCP is the so-called European Emission Trading System.
The theoretical idea to reduce pollution by emission trading is by no means new. It
was already proposed by Dales (1968) and has been discussed in a European
context for years.4 In accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC5 all Member States of
the European Union were obliged to establish an emission-trading scheme as of 1st
of January 2005. Around 5000 operators with approximately 12.000 installations
participate in this multi-jurisdictional attempt to reduce CO2 emissions from four
broad sectors: energy (electric power, oil refineries etc.), the production and
processing of ferrous metals (iron and steel), minerals (cement, glass and ceramics),
pulp and paper.6 The program is implemented in two phases: the first ranging from
2005 to 2007, and the second from 2008 to 2012 and then following 5 year periods,
1 Greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbones (HFCs), perflurocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
2 When reports indicated that mere stabilisation of Greenhouse Gas emissions were insufficient to
prevent a climate change, members to the ‘‘UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’’ committed
themselves in 1997 to emission reductions, the so-called Kyoto Protocol. Following the ratification by
Russia in November 2004, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005.
3 The Council of the European Union approved the Kyoto Protocol on 25 April 2002. See Council
Decision 2002/358/CE.
4 See Dales (1968) and Peeters (1993, pp. 117–134).
5 The Directive entered into force on 25 October 2003.
6 See Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC.
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which resembles the Kyoto Protocol compliance period. The first EC trading phase
should allow Member States to make progress towards meeting their particular CO2
goals committed under the Burden Sharing Agreement7 with respect to the Kyoto
protocol. The trading system may be extended to incorporate other greenhouse
gases and other installations in subsequent periods.8
Even though much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of
Emission Trading Systems, one element of crucial importance that needs to be
addressed in depths is emission allowance allocation.9 The issue of how to allocate
emission allowances has been addressed in the debate whether allowances should
be auctioned or freely distributed (grandfathered). A good example reviewing the
benefits of auctions over grandfathering schemes is presented by Cramton and Kerr
(1999).10 They find that auctions are superior because auction revenues can be recycled
to reduce distortionary taxes (double dividend hypothesis), provide incentives for
innovation and avoid market distorting awarding of politically contentious windfall
profits. Despite their enthusiasm, the authors note that auctions may not be a first
choice because vested interests are much in favour of free allocation. In contrast to this
Stavins (1997)11 presents a good discussion why grandfathering has been widely
accepted. The author cites greater political control and distributional impacts of free
allocation as reasons why grandfathering systems are more readily accepted.
Some works have explicitly included market distortions in their analysis of initial
allocation mechanisms. Parry et al. (1999)12 apply analytical and numerical general
equilibrium models to analyse the efficiency impacts of revenue-recycling carbon
taxes and CO2 grandfathering allocation schemes in the presence of pre-existing
distortionary labour taxes. For such an environment they find that the tax interaction
effect (stemming from higher output prices and falling real wages’ impact on labour
supply) considerably inflates the efficiency costs of CO2 abatement policies, in
particular for grandfathering allocations, which does not generate government
funds. They suggest that revenue-recycling could be a necessary condition for CO2
emission abatement policies to enhance social welfare as long as the environmental
benefits of CO2 abatement are positive.
Frequently, comparisons between initial allocation mechanisms are examined
within a closed economy setting. Some authors have, however also examined
implications of initial emission allowance allocation systems at international level.
7 The Council of the European Union agreed upon the contributions of each Member State to the overall
Community reduction commitment in the Council conclusions of 16 June 1998. Document 9702/98
(Annex I) of 19 June 1998 of the Council of the European Union reflects the outcome of proceedings of
the Environment Council of 16 – 17 June 1998. It should be noted, however, that unlike the new Member
States who are also parties to the Kyoto Protocol, both Malta and Cyprus were qualified as ‘‘developing
countries’’ within the meaning of the UNFCCC and therefore do not have any qualified greenhouse gas
emission targets (see Malta 2004, p. 5; Cyprus 2004, p. 3).
8 Article 2 of Directive 2003/87/EC relates to installations listed in Annex I and to the Greenhouse Gases
listed in Annex II.
9 Gayer (2005, p. 1).
10 Cramton and Kerr (1999).
11 Stavis (1997).
12 Parry et al. (1999).
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Helm (2003)13 for example recognises the problem that there is no central authority
charged with the power to determine initial allocation of tradable emission
allowances on international level. In his article the author compares endogenous
choices of tradable and non-tradable emission allowances by countries, which are
participating in an Emission Trading System and finds that environmentally
concerned countries tend to choose fewer allowances under a trading system. This
positive effect may, however, be offset by incentives of less environmentally
concerned participants to demand more tradable allowances. Maeda (2003)14
examines the implications of market power and initial allocation between
participants of the Kyoto Protocol. The author finds threshold levels that give rise
to competition distorting market power.
Academic articles addressing the relative standards as a basis for initial permit
allocation are still scarce. Gielen et al. (2002)15 compare emission trading with
absolute and relative targets in a partial equilibrium model with an absolute
emission cap. They find that abatement efficiency is safeguarded by a relative
standard, while operators benefit from scarcity rents as well as an output subsidy.
The authors note that deadweight losses cannot be reduced since no funds are raised,
emission constraints are more uncertain and monitoring costs are higher under a
relative system. The high political acceptability of relative target systems is based
upon firms’ ability to expand production within certain limits without having to pay
for additional emissions, less severe competitive pressure vis-a`-vis third countries
and the ease of combining relative target systems with existing regulation.
This paper adds to the existing literature in two ways. First by placing a coherent
typology of emission allowance allocation mechanisms into an emission trading
model and secondly by analysing how various assignment mechanisms deal with
issues such as price determination, allocative efficiency16 and environmental
considerations in a static and dynamic model, how they are ranked and whether they
serve the attainment of the general market equilibrium. The most important multiunit
auction systems, financial allocation mechanisms as well as free allocation
mechanisms are compared with each other. The analysis goes beyond the
traditionally analysed auctioning and grandfathering allocation mechanisms and
pays particular attention to relative standard allocation and specifically the new
Performance Standard Rate Emission Trading System, which is being applied in the
Dutch NOx Emission Trading System. It examines the differences between various
allowance allocation mechanisms with regard to allocative efficiency and the
environment. At first a perfectly competitive static closed economy provides the
framework of analysis. In a subsequent part it is examined how the findings change if
one relaxes the strict theoretical assumptions and allows for a dynamic open
economy setting in which only one economy has introduced emission trading.
13 Helm (2003).
14 Maeda (2003).
15 Gielen et al. (2002, p. 5 ff).
16 Allocative efficiency can be defined as a condition in which all possible gains from exchange are
realised. See Frank (1997, p. 350). This implies that those market participants valuing a good most have
been able to attain it.
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Besides determining which allocation mechanism is more desirable, an important
finding is that here allocation mechanisms have a strong impact on environmental
effectiveness. This impact may merit more attention than the discussion relating to
capped trade and trade without a cap. In the course of the analysis parallels are drawn
to existing Emission Trading Systems such as the Dutch NOx or the European
Emission Trading System where convenient.
Before placing allocation mechanisms in a theoretical framework of Emission
Trading Systems (Sect. 2.3), a general reappraisal of the economic intuition behind
emission abatement and Emission Trading Systems will be presented in Sects. 2.1
and 2.2. Thereafter problems incurred in the context of initial allocation of CO2
emission allowances are reviewed (Sect. 3).
Section 4 discusses allocative efficiency and environmental impacts of initial
allowance allocation mechanisms within a static closed economic setting. After
introducing the static closed economy model (Sect. 4.1) various allocation
mechanisms are reviewed (Sect. 4.2). Because of the symmetry of findings,
environmental considerations with respect to all reviewed allocation mechanisms
are addressed jointly in Sect. 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the findings of this section.
Thereafter the restrictive theoretical assumptions are relaxed and allocative
efficiency is examined in an dynamic open economy setting in section 5. After the
introduction of the model (Sect. 5.1) allocation mechanisms are examined with
regard of their allocative efficiency (Sect. 5.2). Subsequently environmental
considerations are treated (Sect. 5.3). Section 5.4 summarises the main findings.
Section 6 presents an overall conclusion of the paper.
2 Basic economic intuition for abatement and emission trading
2.1 Why abatement?
Economic theory predicts that if a good is under priced, more of it will be used. This
proposition becomes particularly important if its ‘‘excessive’’ use reduces the
standard of living of other market participants. CO2 did not have a market price and
entrepreneurs did not take into account the ‘‘negative externalities’’ i.e. the negative
effects they inflicted upon the environment. This ‘‘market failure’’ can be overcome
by internalizing the negative effects i.e. by bringing the good into the market price
mechanism. The basic intuition behind this is that the price of the good private
parties pay should be inflated to adequately reflect social costs in order to create
incentives to use less of the good. This can be achieved by levying adequate taxes
for each level of usage of the under priced good.17 Figure 1 provides a graphical
representation of this. The introduction of a so called ‘‘Pigou Tax’’ which equals the
vertical distance between a firm’s marginal production costs (Private Marginal
Costs) and the total costs inflicted upon society (Social Marginal Costs), leads to a
price increase of the product from P1 to P2. Because consumers demand less at a
higher price, the quantity of demanded contracts decreases from Q1 to Q2 and
brings about a full reduction of the loss to society.
17 This referred to as the ‘‘Pigou tax’’. See Pigou (1949) Chapter 8.
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Besides market-based instruments to internalise negative external effects, there
are other means to change behaviour of private parties. Private law instruments such
as tort law liability schemes or public law regulations, which can be sanctioned by
administrative and criminal law, can be used.18 The instruments employed in the
European CO2 Emission Trading System are a combination of public law rules,
administrative sanctions and the price mechanism.
With regard to the introduction of CO2 emission allowances, a contraction of the
gross domestic product (GDP) is expected. Despite the reduction in overall
economic output, or rather, precisely due to this contraction, society is better off.
The absolute loss to society that stems from the excessive use of scarce resources is
reduced to a socially desirable level. Since the GDP only takes into account
economically quantifiable data, it does not take into account the destruction of the
environment and is thus not a viable measurement instrument for social wealth.
2.2 Why emission trading?
After having reviewed the basic intuition why abatement benefits society, we now
examine how emission trading can reduce CO2 abatement cost to society.
19 The
optimal quantity of CO2 emission should be reduced until Social Marginal Benefits
from CO2 emissions equal Social Marginal Costs from emissions. In Fig. 2A,
society’s welfare is maximised when emissions are restricted to 20 units of CO2.
In a ‘‘command and control’’ setting, society could order firms to reduce their
emissions by an equal amount. Figure 2B shows CO2 abatement cost structures of











Fig. 1 Internalisation of negative external effects. Sources: Based on Pigou (1949), Chapter 8
18 See Faure and Skogh (2003) particularly Chapters 14 and 16.
19 Since allocation mechanisms and not emission trading systems are the focal point of interest of this
paper, I will restrain myself to merely depict the underlying intuition of such trading systems.
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system, abatement costs for 10 units of CO2 of firm A are given by the area 2, 4, 12,
13 and of firm B by the area 2, 4, 5, 7.
An Emission Trading System allows firms to freely exchange CO2 emission
allowances.20 Firms are thereby enabled to determine themselves which firm will in
fact abate emissions. Because it is cheaper for firm A to buy emission allowances
from firm B, rather than to invest in abatement technology, firm A has an incentive
to buy allowances. If, as in the previous example, allowances are restricted to
20 units, firms will review their marginal abatement costs and engage in trade. Firm
B will reduce its emission by 15 units (costs are given by area 1, 4, 5, 8) while firm
A will only reduce its emission by 5 units (costs are given by area 3, 4, 12, 10). Such
an Emission Trading System generates the same abatement result at a lower cost
than a command and control system. This can be seen in the fact that area 2, 3, 10,
13, representing the costs of firm A abating five additional units, is bigger than area
1, 2, 7, 8, which represents the costs of firm B abating five more units. Thus the
overall cost savings of the CO2 emission reduction is the difference between firm
A’s cost to abate CO2 units 10–15, (area 2, 3, 10, 13) and firm B’s cost to abate CO2
units 5–10 (area 1, 2, 7, 8).
According to the European Commission’s own assessment21 the EU’s cost of
climate policy of the Emission Trading System will be between 2.9 and 3.7 billion
euros. In the absence of a trading system, the environmental costs would amount to
6.8 billion euros.
Fig. 2 Abatement costs. Source: Own representation
20 This finding has long been proposed by scholars. For a similar explanation see Tietenberg (1994, p.
222 ff).
21 European Commission, (2004, p. 8).
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2.3 Emission trading systems
After having presented the general economic rationale behind CO2 emission
allowances and emission trading, the conceptual framework on which the current
paper is based will be introduced. With regard to Emission Trading Systems,
three different elements can be distinguished: these elements are the Quantity
Setting, the Allowance Allocation Mechanism and the Trading System (see
Fig. 3).
On the first layer, ‘‘Quantity Setting’’, society determines to what extent it
wishes to reduce CO2 emissions.
22 The scarcity of the emission allowances can be
expressed in absolute terms, setting an absolute amount of emission allowances, or
Fig. 3 Emission trading system. Source: Own representation
22 To motivate the United States and major developing countries to effectively control their greenhouse
gas emissions is a core challenge for the international climate ‘‘regime’’ beyond the Kyoto Protocol.
Studies addressing problems related to international emission allowance allocation include Lecocq and
Crassous (2003) and Bo¨ringer and Welsch (2004). It should be noted that determining the socially
desirable level of pollution is a non-trivial task in the presence of imperfect information about present and
future benefits and damages of pollution and the problem of collective action. Some economic models




in relative23 terms. Relative scarcity can be expressed as being dependent on
prescribed industry standards or on a certain tonnage of CO2 emission per unit of
GDP. Independent of the basis on which scarcity is measured, an absolute amount of
CO2 emission permits has to be determined so that they can be allocated in the next
stage. With regard to the European Emission Trading System, Directive 2003/87/EC
requires Member State governments to set absolute quantities of CO2 emission
allowances in their National Allocation Plans.
An ‘‘Allowance Allocation Mechanism’’ serves to initially allocate a predeter-
mined amount of emission allowances. It therefore deals with the initial distribution
of emission allowances amongst market participants but not with the operation of
the emission trading market. Figure 3 shows a number of different generic formats
of allocation mechanisms. All of them will be reviewed in this paper. Auctions and
financial allocation systems require market participants to pay for emission
allowances. The difference between the two is that auctions allow market
participants to determine the price they will pay in accordance with the prescribed
auction rules while other financial administrative allocation mechanisms allow
administrative bodies more discretion24 in price determination and final distribution.
In contrast to the two preceding mechanisms, free allocation mechanisms do not
require payment. Administrative bodies can base their allocation decision on
historic production data (grandfathering), on relative production standards or any
other administrative criteria. ‘‘Trading Systems’’ do not deal with issues of initial
allocation. They treat the allowances that are on the market as given. Trading
systems provide a cost-effective system of exchange and determine the criteria on
which market participants are allowed to emit CO2.
A ‘‘cap’’ prescribes the maximum amount of CO2 emission that a country is
willing to emit. Under a ‘‘cap and trade’’ system a maximum emission ceiling is
installed. No emissions are permissible beyond that ceiling. Each firm has to submit
at the end of a time period enough CO2 allowances to comply with its prescribed
obligations. These obligations can be based on the absolute emission per firm or a
relative performance standard. Firms will also have to comply with their obligations
under a trading system that does not have a cap. The difference between a cap and a
non-cap trading system is that in the former the absolute amount of CO2 emission is
prescribed, while in the latter it is not. Yet also in the absence of a cap emission
reduction goals can be set on environmental production standards.
One particular emission-trading system merits special attention: the so-called
‘‘Performance Standard Rate System’’, in short PSR. In this system emitting entities
are free to produce but have to compare their actual emission level per unit of output
with that prescribed by the government’s benchmark. The emitting entity has to
account for every emitted ton in excess of the benchmark and pay a punishment if it
cannot attain CO2 emission allowances via the Emission Trading System or benefit
23 One successful example of an allowance trading program which applies such relative criteria is the
American lead trading program. The program provides incentives for the diffusion of cost-saving
technology, see Kerr and Newell (2003). For a brief review of the program see Kerr and Newell (2003,
p. 320 ff) and UNEP, UNCTAD (2002, p. 9 and p. 23).
24 It should be noted that through the selection of auction rules administrative bodies are also able to
influence prices.
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from past or future savings. One important specialty about the PSR trading system,
which distinguishes it further from ordinary relative standard base benchmark
allocation systems is that the emission allowances are not created by the government
and distributed to emitting entities. A legal act obliges emitting entities to meet
particular emission targets, to have them accredited by third parties and to report
them to the government. While the government takes an active role in monitoring the
compliance to the law, it is not participating as an actor. Government takes a laissez
faire approach limiting itself to creating the rules to be followed by emitting entities.
In this sense, the PSR system is operated by private entities who are able to sell their
accredited savings to other market participants via a cost effective trading system.25
As already indicated the field of interest of this paper does not encompass the
entire Emission Trading System but is restricted to allowance allocation mecha-
nisms. Therefore it suffices to note that Emission Trading Systems have been
subject to research26 and that the European Emission Trading System has been
drawing from past experience.27
3 What is the problem of initial allocation?
From a socio-economic perspective, there are three important considerations with
respect to initial allocation mechanisms. These regard price determination, allocative
efficiency and in accordance with the overall objective of the Emission Trading
System, environmental considerations. Each will be discussed in turn.
3.1 Why do we need prices?
The economic problem at hand is that an allocation mechanism has to allocate CO2
emission allowances to firms in such a way as to distort markets in the least possible
way. From a social welfare point of view, the operator placing the highest value on
an emission allowance should be able to use it. Due to the fact that in reality, true
CO2 abatement cost structures of the individual installations are only known to
operators themselves, the true value they place on CO2 emission allowances is
unknown to the allocating entity. Quite naturally firms would like to buy emission
allowances for less than they are worth to them and are therefore reluctant to reveal
their true value to the allocating entity. Market prices are able to overcome such
problems of information asymmetry where one party knows more than another. In
accordance with the law of demand and supply, prices reveal individuals’
preferences. In particular, market prices fulfil two important functions. First, prices
serve to redirect existing supplies of a product to those users that value the good
most; this is also referred to as the ‘‘rationing function of prices’’.28 Second, prices
25 This passages draws from European Commission (2003).
26 For a recent summary of market-based policies see Stavins (2001, 2003).
27 Kruger and Pizer (2004, p. 6).
28 See Frank (1997, p. 43).
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redirect resources from less productive uses to more productive ones. This is called
the ‘‘allocative function of prices’’.29
With regard to the initial allocation of CO2 emission allowances, however, the
problem is that there is no such market price. In order to ensure both the rationing as
well as the allocative functions of the price, there are two possibilities. Either a well
functioning trading system can reduce inefficiencies stemming from the initial
allocation of emission allowances or the employed allocation mechanism leads to
the revelation of ‘true’ values of allowances.30 Both will be examined below.
An efficient trading scheme would allow all market participants to trade emission
allowances at minimal costs. In the presence of a trading system with sufficiently low
transaction costs, an optimal resource allocation will result on the market irrespective of
how allocation mechanisms distribute emission allowances.31 Thus if an operator values
an allowance higher than another operator which has been awarded a permit, both would
engage in trade. Hence, the absence of a market price does not create severe economic
obstacles to the attainment of a market equilibrium if a trading system is present.
An efficient trading system can, however not ensure the attainment of a special
market equilibrium: the general market equilibrium. At this equilibrium the
production market gives rise to an optimal product mix and consumers have also
realised all gains from exchange. Only if an allocation would be sufficiently close to
this special market equilibrium, it could be reached through market exchanges. It
can, however, also be reached directly if market operators would be forced to reveal
their ‘‘true’’ values of allowances,32 such as through an auctioning allocation system.
To summarise, the relevant criteria to be assessed are the revelation of
operators’ valuations of emission allowances (price determination), whether those
market participants who value the CO2 emission allowance most will be able to
attain it (allocative efficiency) as well as adverse effects on the efficiency of the
Emission Trading System. In principle, if either an efficient price determination
mechanism or an efficient allocation of emission allowances can be ensured, the
absence of a price will not per se constitute a problem from an allocative
efficiency point of view. Yet only an allocation mechanism that leads to a true
revelation of preferences will be able to attain the general equilibrium of the
economy with an optimal production mix.
3.2 Allocative efficiency
The preceding section has shown that CO2 emission allowance allocation mecha-
nisms can be equally desirable from an allocative efficiency point of view, but they
do not necessarily lead to the same equilibrium outcome. When an allowance with no
intrinsic value is introduced into the market price mechanism, real value is created33
29 See Frank (1997, p. 43).
30 Auctions can lead to such desirable revelation of private values.
31 Coase (1960).
32 Auctions can lead to such desirable revelation of private values.
33 This is analogous to the concept of ‘‘seigniorage’’ when a government exploits the monopoly power of
the central bank to create money as a means of raising real resources.
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due to market participants’ willingness to attribute value to such an allowance.
Windfall profits accrue to the issuing entity if emission permits are sold to the market
participants. If allowances are allocated free of charge or below their true market
value, windfall profits accrue to the recipients. The discussion who should be
awarded a windfall profit can be led on a (scientific) welfare economic level or on a
(normative) social choice level.
With respect to the scientific dimension of this question, there may be a strong
rationale to allocate wealth to those groups of society who invest it most wisely34 or
to those who create the strongest impulse for economic growth.35 Costs and benefits
should be compared and resources should be allocated in such a way as to maximise
social welfare.
From a societal point of view, however, there may be strong normative grounds to
prefer a different allocation. Society may refer to normative principles such as the
‘‘polluter pays’’ principle in order to determine how emission allowances should be
distributed.36 Besides such general principles, society could decide that consumers,
producers or taxpayers should benefit the most from an allocation mechanism. Or
society could, for example, decide that CO2 emission allowances should be allocated
to small and medium-sized enterprises in order to reward them for their labour-
intensive production.37 In such a case large operators, which are not awarded
allowances, will have to acquire them. The monetary transfer constitutes a pecuniary,
i.e. a redistributive, effect38 to the extent that it does not have a bearing on the overall
social welfare. To the extent that such measures do affect the size of the overall
economy39 or distort competition on the merits and lead to a different market
equilibrium, they create undesirable effects from an economic point of view.
If particular firms may be put in a position of comparative disadvantage because
their competitors benefit from a subsidy in form of CO2 emission allowances which
effectively reduces their production costs, or if their production costs are unduly
inflated, this can lead to strong market distortions and even adversely affect the
common market. In this context state aid implications of initial allocation schemes
under Article 87 EC Treaty40 and distortions of competition created by Member
States that could fall within the ambit of Articles 81 and 8241 are relevant.
To summarise, the overall social welfare should be as large as possible, and mere
redistributive effects of initial allocations can be ‘‘rationalised’’ by social choice
34 Here industrial policy issues come to mind.
35 A ‘‘multiplier effect’’ denotes a phenomenon whereby some initial increase or decrease in the rate of
spending will bring about a more than proportional change in national income.
36 For an early statement of the strong acceptance of the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle see OECD (1974)
Recommendation C (74) 223. The ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle is inscribed in Article 174 (2) of the EC
Treaty.
37 It may be noted that many economists are critical of such arguments. Economists tend to emphasise
overall social welfare and production efficiency and tend to prefer to leave such normative standpoints to
politicians.
38 Cullis and Jones (1998, p. 133).
39 Through, for example, multiplier effects.
40 See Weishaar (2006a).
41 See Weishaar (2006b).
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arguments. To the extent that market distortions caused by certain social choices
give rise to competitive disadvantages and distort the general equilibrium, however,
they should be subject to severe scrutiny.
3.3 Environmental considerations
Even though scholars have been arguing that the initial allocation of emission
allowances as such does not affect their use,42 the above discussion has shown that
initial allocations are important. If operators are maximizing their profits and the
Emission Trading System works efficiently43 reallocation of emission allowances
will occur over a certain range. In such circumstances market participants valuing
an emission allowance the most will attain it, irrespective of its initial allocation and
give rise to allocative efficiency. From an environmental point of view, however, it
does, not matter who will eventually ‘‘use’’ the emission allowances, i.e. in which
sector of the economy CO2 is produced. It is the atmospheric CO2 concentration
dependent on the absolute amount of CO2 emission and the timing of emissions,
which is of importance in terms of environmental effects.
4 Static closed economy
This part of the paper consists of three parts. After introducing the concept of a
static closed economy, the allocative efficiency of various initial allocation
mechanisms within the framework of a closed static economy is examined.
Subsequently the environmental impacts of these mechanisms are reviewed.
4.1 Static closed economy model
Because reality is very complex, models are used to gain a better understanding of
intricate relationships between variables. Models construct an artificial framework
of analysis based on assumptions how reality could look like. In this section, a static
closed economy model is introduced. Unlike an open economy, a closed economy is
not influenced by any form of international trade. Nothing can be exported or
imported because there is only one economy within this analytical framework. For
the sake of analysis, this assumption simplifies the complex interactions within the
economy to analyse the circular flow of national income. In this paper we are,
however, not interested in national income as such but rather in the allocative
efficiency of CO2 emission allocation mechanisms and its environmental impacts.
Therefore only these issues are being analysed. In this part of the paper I have
chosen a static economy which presents only a snap-shot but does not allow for
42 Tietenberg (2002, p. 3).
43 This again implies that transaction costs are sufficiently low so that the operator with the lowest
abatement costs has every incentive to sell its CO2 emission allowance on the market, rather than using it.
This is again an application of the Coase theorem.
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strategic firm behaviour. In the second part of this paper these assumptions are
relaxed to allow both dynamic firm reaction and trade.
4.2 Comparison of allocation mechanisms and allocative efficiency
Having introduced the static closed economy model and presented the importance
and function of initial allocation mechanisms, the next section will provide a
comparison of allocation mechanisms. Criteria used for comparison are price
determination, allocative efficiency and possible adverse effects of allocation
mechanisms on trading systems.
This section consists of two parts. The first part addresses auction mechanisms,
the second examines other financial allocation mechanisms and free initial
allocation mechanisms, including grandfathering and ‘‘relative standard base’’
systems.
4.2.1 Auctions as an allocation mechanism
Auctions have become enormously popular and are being used in a large number of
economic exchanges both in the public and private sector. Just two prominent
examples are mobile phone licenses and the decentralisation of electricity markets.
There are four reasons rendering this allocation mechanism attractive. First, an
auction is designed to lead to self-revelation of the bidder’s private values. In the
presence of inherent information asymmetry, in which a potential seller is unable to
determine the market value of a particular object, an auction mechanism can yield
higher revenues than simply quoting a price or repeated negotiations with potential
buyers. While this is very desirable from a theoretical point of view, it should be
noted that bidders are generally reluctant to reveal their preferences because they
fear that competitors could take advantage of it—protection of such information is
crucial for firms. Second, auctions can be designed in such a way as to ensure
allocative efficiency. It should be noted that efficiency here is to be understood as to
award the bidder with the highest valuation for an object with the tender.44 Third,
auctions legitimise transfers which would otherwise be suspect. Prior knowledge of
the auction rules provides bidders with a transparent framework of how their bids
will be assessed while at the same time ensuring bidders that selling agents have
clear and indiscreet tender selection criteria.45 Fourth, since no time consuming
negotiation has to take place, auctions are fast allocation mechanisms. Though it
should be noticed that the development of an auction mechanism depends on the
object being auctioned and can be a non-trivial, time consuming process.
This section of the paper is subdivided into two parts. The first part introduces
general auction formats. Drawing from that, the second part will present auction
44 Implicitly assuming away the possibility of credit rationed bidders. See Milgrom (2004, p. 57).
Maximisation of social welfare, defined as the maximisation of the sum of producer surplus and consumer
surplus can be reached if side-payments (in the presence of budget balance constraints) are possible. In
such cases Pareto optimal allocations are feasible in which one person is better off without someone else
being worse off.
45 See Rothkopf and Harstad (1994, p. 368).
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theory’s contributions to CO2 allocation mechanisms. A conclusion will summarise
the main points.
Auction formats. An auction can be understood as a set of rules, which translates
information revealed by bidders by means of an allocation rule, and a payment rule
into efficient outcomes. The challenge of auction theory is to develop auction rules
which are tailored to the preferences of bidders in such a way as to provide Pareto
optimal46 allocations. Auctions do not only differ with regard to allocation and
payment rules but also with respect to the amount of information they require
bidders to reveal.
There are numerous possibilities to design auctions. These models fall into
several categories, or formats. A standard auction is an auction in which the highest
bidder amongst potential buyers, or the lowest bidder amongst potential sellers
wins. Since there is an almost perfect correspondence in results,47 it is quite
unimportant to distinguish between both forms.48 Standard auctions are commonly
distinguished into ‘‘open’’ and ‘‘closed’’ auctions. In open auctions bidders are
aware of their competitors’ bids while in closed ones they are not. Two examples of
open auctions are the ascending price auction, also called the English auction, and
the descending price auction, also known as the Dutch auction. Two examples of
closed auctions are the second-price sealed-bid auction, frequently referred to as
Vickrey auction,49 and the first-price sealed-bid auction. The four standard auction
types are presented in Table 1.
In an open ascending price (English) auction, the price is raised by the auctioneer
or by bidders themselves until only one bidder remains. At any particular point in
time bidders know the level of the current best bid.50 Such auctions are often used
by auction houses like Sotheby’s. In the open descending price (Dutch) auction the
price decreases continuously until one bidder accepts the current price. A well-
known example where (sequential) open descending price (Dutch) auctions are used
is the flower auction in Aalsmeer (the Netherlands). In a closed sealed-bid auction
Table 1 Standard auction types
Open auctions Closed auctions
Ascending price auctions (English auction) Second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction)
Descending price auction (Dutch auction) First-price sealed-bid auction
46 Pareto optimality describes situations in which it is impossible to make one person better off without
making at least someone else worse off. In the absence of side payments between bidders, i.e. when
bidders are unable to compensate each other, Pareto efficient but suboptimal allocations can occur.
47 With the possible exception of the invalidity of reserve prices and treating zero as an implicit limit to
acceptable bids. Despite the intuitive appeal of the later argument, Shubik (1983, p. 39 ff) cites Herodotus
reporting on Babylonian marriage markets which did include auctions starting at negative bidding values.
48 Rothkopf and Harstad (1994, p. 366).
49 Named after Nobel laureate William Vickrey, who first presented this auction in his seminal paper on
auctions. Vickrey (1961).
50 McAfee and McMillan (1987, p. 702).
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bidders are only allowed to enter one bid, thus they are unable to react ex post to
their rivals. In the closed first-price sealed-bid auction the highest bid wins, while in
the closed second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction, the highest bidder is only
required to pay a price equal to the second highest bid.
After having reviewed the four standard auction types, the following section
examines auction mechanisms, which could be used to initially allocate CO2
emission allowances.
Multiunit auctions. Under Directive 2003/87/EC each tradable permit is defined
as 1 ton of CO2 equivalent over a designated period of time.
51 Later the trading may
be extended to other greenhouse gases with an equivalent global-warming potential
of 1 CO2 ton.
52
Because the benefit derived by operators from attaining one CO2 equivalent ton is
the same irrespective of the greenhouse gas they purchase, the good is clearly a
substitute53 and can thus be treated as a homogeneous i.e. a similar good, from an
auction design point of view.
Surprisingly little is known about efficiency properties of multiunit auctions. A lot of
the conventional wisdom comes by analogy from single-unit auctions54 but a sound
understanding of how equilibria respond when assumptions about values and information
change are not yet answered at any level of generality.55 Since participants to an emission
trading auction will generally acquire larger quantities of allowances, multiunit auctions
are of core interest. As in the case for single-unit auctions, auction designers strive to
reach two goals. They try to ensure an efficient outcome and to maximise revenues. Even
though these goals are closely related, here we merely focus on efficiency criteria as the
relevant benchmark because revenue maximisation focusses on redistribution of wealth
rather than the maximisation of consumer and producer surplus.
In this section, two general multiple auction methods that could be used to
allocate CO2 emission allowances are reviewed. First, sequential auctions in which
one allowance would be sold after the other and secondly, simultaneous auction
models in which multiple CO2 emission allowances are sold at the same time. The
later group is subdivided into open and closed auction formats. Because strategic
firm behaviour such as e.g. demand reduction, undermines allocative efficiency a
short review is presented whenever appropriate.
Sequential auctions are easy to implement for auctioneers but are not very
much favoured by bidders. One reason is the strategic complexity of bidding
decisions and the inevitable price variation of sequential auctions of homogeneous
goods.56 Ashenfelter (1989) has termed this ‘‘declining price anomaly’’57 and
51 Defined in Article 3 (a) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
52 Defined in Article 3 (j) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
53 If obtaining one good makes the bidder willing to pay more for a second good, the goods are
complements, if the bidder is willing to pay less, they are substitutes.
54 Ausubel and Cramton (2002, p. 1).
55 See Bo¨rgers and Van Damme (2004, p. 43).
56 Inefficiencies from synergies and complementariness of goods appear to be smaller if goods are
homogeneous.
57 Ashenfelter (1989, p. 29 ff).
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explained a falling price in subsequent auctions58 in terms of bidder’s necessity to
acquire particular quantities, risk aversion59 and uncertainty.60 From an allocative
efficiency point of view, auctions ensuring a single market price as e.g. uniform-
price auctions are preferred over sequential auctions because they mitigate the
‘price risk’ of paying too much for the same good.61 In general, an auction format
that cannot ensure that the bidder with the highest valuation always receives the
good cannot be allocative efficient, and hence not be a viable first-choice option
as a CO2 emission allocation system. If such auction schemes were to be chosen,
allocative efficiency would have to be established on an efficiently operating
emission trading market.
After having reviewed sequential auctions, simultaneous multiunit auctions are
reviewed. At first, simultaneous closed sealed-bid auction models are examined.
Thereafter simultaneous open ascending price auctions models are treated.
Due to their importance, three simultaneous closed sealed-bid auction models are
discussed here.62 These are pay-as-you-bid, uniform-price auction and multiunit
Vickrey auction. Each will be discussed in turn.
The pay-as-you-bid63 is a closed sealed-bid auction in which bidders simulta-
neously submit demand schedules64 for goods. Bidders win the quantity demanded
at the clearing price and pay the particular price for each unit as indicated in their
submitted demand schedule. In order not to pay unnecessary high amounts for
emission allowances, bidders have to estimate the market clearing price and bid
slightly above it. This exposes less informed bidders to the strategic risk of
misjudging the clearing price and pay ‘‘more’’ for identical goods. This increases
the transaction costs to the parties of participating in a bid and may even deter
potential bidders from participating, which in turn reduces the competitiveness of
the entire market and hence its efficiency.
The uniform-price auction is a closed sealed-bid auction in which bidders
simultaneously submit demand schedules for goods and pay the clearing price for
every unit demanded at that particular price. In contrast to the pay-as-you-bid
auction, this auction format has two advantages. First, every bidder pays the market-
clearing price, which is equal to the overall marginal valuation. Second, in the
absence of the danger of paying too much for the same good, less informed bidders
are more inclined to participate in such auctions.
Both, the pay-as-you-bid auction and the uniform auction format can be expected
to be inefficient in the presence of market power or collusion. In such cases they
58 See Ashenfelter and Graddy (2002, pp. 34–36) and Table 8 for a review of subsequent research.
59 Risk aversion implies that bidders dislike taking fair bids. McAfee and Vincent (1993) show that risk
aversion can create declining prices.
60 See Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2005).
61 Milgrom (2004, p. 256).
62 See Krishna (2002) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002).
63 Also called ‘‘discriminatory auctions’’ or ‘‘multiple price auctions’’.
64 In this section all demand schedules are assumed to be downward sloping, i.e. more is being demanded
if the price decreases.
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may give rise to inefficiency65 inducing ‘‘demand reduction’’ strategies.66 In
multiunit auctions dominant players recognise the interdependence of their bidding
strategy and competitors’ bidding behaviour. A strategy of self restricting the
quantity demanded while bidding the minimum price to indicate interest in a
number of units can generate large consumer surpluses. The inherent inefficiency
stems from the fact that users with the highest value for a good do in fact prefer not
to attain it; large bidders win too little and small bidders win too much. Salmon
(2003)67 points out that if such behaviour is strictly unilateral, this does not amount
to collusion. However, if it does involve strategic considerations exemplified by
trigger strategies, such behaviour would amount to (tacit) collusion.68
The third sealed-bid multiunit auction format reviewed here does not suffer from
demand reduction in private-value environments.69 The closed second-price sealed-
bid auction system (a multiunit Vickrey auction), is an auction in which bidders
simultaneously submit demand schedules for goods. Bidders win the quantity
demanded at the clearing price and pay an amount equal to the highest losing bid for
each unit. Since sincere bidding is a dominant strategy, allocative efficiency
distorting demand reduction will not occur.
In contrast to closed auction formats, in open multiunit auctions the price and the
allocation of emission allowances are determined by open competition. In cases of
considerable uncertainty with regard to future market development and future
technological developments, bidders’ valuations may depend on information held
by other bidders. The ‘‘feedback’’ that bidders get in the process of bidding in
ascending auctions formats renders them more efficient than sealed-bid auction
formats when it comes to solving complex allocation problems.
The open uniform-price ascending auction is the dynamic version of the closed
sealed-bid uniform-price auction. For each slowly increasing price quoted by a
fictitious auctioneer, bidders are allowed to observe and respond by quoting
quantities they wish to purchase. Quantities demanded are added horizontally in
order to determine the market demand. As long as demand exceeds supply, the price
will be increased. Unlike in the closed sealed-bid uniform-price auction, in the open
ascending-price auction bidders can be informed about other bidders’ demanded
quantities.
65 Inefficiency is created by ‘‘differential bid shading’’, i.e. when bidders with identical marginal values
reduce their bids by different amounts so that awarding the bidder who values the item most is
impossible. See Ausubel and Cramton (2002, p. 4).
66 For examples see Weber (1997) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002).
67 Salmon (2003, p. 5).
68 Distinguishing between tacit collusion and pure strategic firm behaviour is complicated if not
impossible. In a multiunit auction both bidders could, for example, independently decide to pursue a
‘‘demand reducing’’ strategy. The outcome would be identical to tacit and indeed outright collusion.
69 In private-value models bidders are assumed to have knowledge, which is strictly private to them such
as for example the price they would be willing to pay in a tender. Common-value models in contrast,
assume that the actual value is identical to all participants, but bidders do have diverging private
information about this value. Unlike in private-value environments, in common-value environments
Vickrey auctions do not always produce efficient equilibria. To the extend that emission allowances




Open ascending-price auctions are easily implemented since bidders will only
have to quote the quantity demanded and observe simple activity rules. As the
simultaneous ascending (multiunit) auctions, which can be applied in contexts when
goods are not identical, this auction format is vulnerable to demand reduction and
collusion. In cases where market power is limited, inefficiencies from standard
ascending-price auctions are also expected to be low.
Kagel and Levin (2001) suggest that demand reduction can be stronger under the
open ascending-price auction than under the closed sealed-bid uniform-price
auction.70 With respect to (tacit) collusion in multiunit open ascending price auction
environments, Ausubel and Schwartz (1999)71 postulates the existence of a unique
cooperative equilibrium if bidders are able to use backward induction.72 If bidders fail
to immediately reach a low price outcome, signalling73 can be employed to
‘‘negotiate’’ a mutually acceptable allocation. In a simultaneous ascending price bid
auction environment with a limited number of participants and known limit prices of
fringe firms, Grimm et al. (2001)74 cite a powerful example of how effectively
signalling can be used to reach an almost immediate mutually acceptable strategic
demand reduction.
While signalling and demand reduction certainly are strong points of critique of open
multiunit ascending-price auctions, there are two factors which complicate effective
collusion. First, Brusco and Lopomo (1999)75 show that the collusion becomes more
difficult as the number of bidders relative to the number of items rises. Weber (1997)76
presents a vivid example of how difficult it can be to reach a mutually acceptable
allocation of heterogeneous permits when the number of participants is large. Second,
Brusco and Lopomo (1999)77 show that considerable externalities or synergies across
items negatively impact prospects of collusion.78 The authors conclude that due to
signaling,79 collusion is possible, even in the presence of a high ratio of bidders to objects
and under some complementarities in bidders’ utility functions.
For its favourable efficiency properties the Ausubel auction deserves particular
mentioning. Ausubel (2002)80 proposed an efficient ascending auction design for
homogeneous goods that eliminates incentives for demand reduction81 and rewards
70 See Kagel and Levin (2001).
71 See Ausubel and Schwartz (1999).
72 Bidders are assumed to imagine how the auction will be developing and to derive from this a mutually
acceptable offer at the beginning of the auction.
73 By for example using the financially inconsequential digits of their bids, parties can signal their
identity or indicate the market for which they are retaliating.
74 Grimm et al. (2001).
75 Brusco and Lopomo (1999).
76 Weber (1997).
77 Brusco and Lopomo (1999).
78 For an analysis of externalities in single-unit auctions, the interested reader is referred to Caillaud and
Jehiel (1998).
79 See Cramton and Schwartz (2002) for an insightful analysis of FCC spectrum auctions.
80 Ausubel (2002). Earlier versions of this paper date back till 1997.
81 For an experimental assessment see Kagel and Levin (2001).
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the revelation of true values.82 As in the ascending-price auction, quoted prices
continuously increase until demand equals supply. The bidder demanding the
highest quantity when the collective demand of all other bidders is one unit less than
the total quantity supplied, will be rewarded one unit at the current price.
Consequently the bidder with the highest valuation for a particular unit is able to
secure it and pay the price indicated in the demand schedule. Notwithstanding the
notable efficiency properties which the Ausubel-auction demonstrates in both
private-value and common-value environments, Manelli et al. (1999) find that this
auction format generates incentives for bidders to engage in strategic overbidding to
mislead competitors.83
The above can be summarised as follows. Sequential multiunit auctions are easy
to implement but due to the complexity of bidding strategies they require and their
inability to ensure allocative efficiency, they will not serve as an efficient means to
allocate CO2 emission allowances.
With respect to closed multiunit auctions, simultaneous sealed bid uniform-price
auctions are likely to be more allocatively efficient than pay-as-you-bid auction
schemes because the costly strategic burden of misjudging the clearing price is not
placed upon firms. Even in the presence of demand reduction, small firms would
benefit from it and consequently have every incentive to participate in the auction
which in turn would mitigate effectiveness of demand reduction strategies. Auction
rules in both auction formats are easy to understand for bidders but the strategic
complexity of placing bids is non-trivial. If one, however, would only consider
efficiency from an auction theoretic point of view, the efficiency ranking of pay-as-
you bid auctions and uniform-price auctions is ambiguous.84
In the presence of market power on emission allowance markets, the multiunit
Vickrey auction is clearly more efficient since it does not give rise to demand
reduction. In the absence of market power, a uniform-price auction is similarly
efficient and due to the simplicity of the auction rules and price uniformity at first
sight it may generate even more desirable results.85 Since it is difficult for firms to
develop good bidding strategies, multiunit Vickrey auctions, in which true bidding
is a dominant strategy, may be socially more desirable. This will be the case if—and
only if—firms could be convinced that the information they reveal is kept secret at
all times.
With regard to open multiunit auction formats, it has been shown that open
ascending auction systems are allocatively efficient if there is no market power. In
those cases where there is market power on the emission trading market, the
Ausubel auction may be a viable option.
One can therefore conclude that auction mechanisms can be used effectively for
the allocation of CO2 emission allowances. Auctions do solve the problem of price
determination by allowing bidders to ‘‘reveal’’ (at least part of) their preferences.
Auctions are therefore capable of attaining the general equilibrium of an economy.
82 Ausubel replicates the intuition of the Vickrey auction in a dynamic context.
83 Manelli et al. (1999, p. 3).
84 Ausubel and Cramton (2002, p. 16 ff).
85 Cramton and Kerr (1999, p. 6).
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Auctions can, however, also give rise to strategic behaviour of bidders. Allocative
inefficiencies stemming from e.g. demand reduction could, however, be corrected
ex post, if large bidders are able to acquire emission allowances through efficient
trading systems.
4.2.2 Administrative allocation mechanisms
After having reviewed how auctions can be used as an emission allowance
allocation system, we turn to two different mechanisms. Both have in common the
relative importance of administrative bodies. First financial administrative alloca-
tion mechanisms will be briefly reviewed before free administrative allocation
mechanisms will be introduced.
Financial administrative allocation mechanisms. In the preceding section auction
mechanisms have been reviewed. In contrast to these fully market-based instruments,
other financial emission allowance allocation mechanisms can be considered. Such
instruments are more akin to ‘‘command and control’’ mechanisms to the extent that
they attribute an active role to bureaucrats.
All or part of the emission allowances could be sold. Either on the basis that
society wants to recoup expenses for the establishment of an Emission Trading
System or because it would like to grant industries preferential access to emission
allowances at a price which lies below a competitive market price.86
From an allocative efficiency point of view, it is certain that bureaucrats will
perform less efficiently than purely market-based financial allocation mechanisms.
First because civil servants are likely to be less well-informed about the particular
needs of an enterprise than entrepreneurs themselves. And second because firms do
have an incentive to misstate their true valuation in order to attain more
allowances.87 Thus due to bureaucrats’ inability to determine the optimal price
correctly, any interference in the allocation mechanism will lead to less efficient
allowance allocation. In other words it is unlikely that bureaucrats are able to
allocate emission allowances in such a way as to reach the general equilibrium of
the economy. In the presence of an efficient trading system, however, inefficient
initial allocation of emission allowances can be remedied by the market88 and an
efficient allocation is safeguarded. Yet this efficient allocation can but does not have
to be equal to the general equilibrium.
While administrative financial allocation mechanisms are certainly undesirable
from a general equilibrium point of view, it should be noted that society would only
be worse off if the resulting allocation would not be reflecting its preferences. Even
if there are normative grounds (such as equity considerations), which would justify
86 With regard to such schemes, state aid considerations under Article 87 of the EC Treaty are relevant.
87 Such an incentive will be present as long as the expected rewards outweigh costs placed upon
violators. Becker (1968, pp. 169–217), shows that disutility from trespassing legislation can be modelled
as being a function of the detection probability, the level of punishment and the risk averseness of the
violator.
88 This is again subject to the assumption that transaction costs are sufficiently low and that markets
operate efficiently.
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an administrative influence in financial allocation mechanisms, it should be
examined whether the positive effects cannot be created in a less distortive manner.
Free administrative allocation mechanisms. A free administrative allocation
mechanism does not require payments for emission allowances. Based on
administrative criteria, allowances are distributed to market participants. There
are numerous possibilities of how to distribute emission allowances. They may
differ as much with regard to the social group they set at a comparative advantage as
to the criteria they apply as a basis for allocation. Society may distribute allowances
to virtually anybody. Firms may be rewarded for their labour intensiveness of
production or families for having many children. Promising economic sectors, low-
income families, art galleries etc. are other examples. It is obvious that in free
administrative allocation mechanisms normative distribution justifications based on
society’s preferences or industrial policy considerations prevail over general
equilibrium and allocative efficiency considerations.
In the presence of an efficient trading market those market participants who
value an emission allowance most are able to attain it. Provided, of course, that
there is no significant leakage of allowances because some recipients prefer to
save rather than to use or sell them. Furthermore, the liquidity of the emission
trading market may be undermined if transaction costs for initial recipients may
be high. This would unduly increase the financial burden, which is placed upon
those market participants which value emission allowances most and constitute a
real waste to society. If society would like to support particular groups, it should
consider using more direct means such as tax cuts or direct monetary transfers
accruing from auction proceeds.
There are, however, two incompatible free allocation mechanisms, which merit
particular attention. These are the so-called grandfathering and the relative standard
base allocation system. Each will be discussed in turn.
(a) Grandfathering. Bureaucrats can allocate emission allowances for free on the
basis of historic data. There are three bases, which can be used to allocate
allowances. First, input-based (used historic energy input); second, output-based
(e.g. kilowatt-hours of electricity production); or, third, emission-based (direct or
indirect i.e. total emission from emitting facilities).89 Furthermore, the base period
for historic data has to be determined. As can be seen from these choices, allocating
emission allowances is a non-trivial matter that is likely to generate a high
administrative burden and provoke both strong opposition from disadvantaged
parties and welfare reducing lobbying.90
As other free allocation mechanisms, grandfathering systems cannot be expected
to generate an allocatively efficient initial distribution of emission allowances and
for the reasons highlighted above may also fail to establish a general equilibrium.
Since grandfathering systems will allocate allowances to operators directly and
therefore to a societal group which naturally has a high valuation for CO2 emissions,
it is obvious that grandfathering mechanisms can be allocatively superior to other
89 Harrision and Radov (2002, p. 60 ff).
90 Cullis and Jones (1998, p. 93 ff).
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free allocation mechanisms.91 Since allocation is based on historic emissions and is
not based on abatement cost structures of firms, they will always be less efficient
than auction models, even in the presence of perfect information.
(b) Relative standard base mechanisms. As discussed above, there are many
possible criteria on which emission allowance allocation can be based. One can also
envisage a free allocation on the basis of industry specific CO2 emission standards.
Such standards can be quoted, for instance, in CO2-ton per production unit or in
terms of CO2 efficiency per amount of GDP produced. Such relative standard base
allocation systems form part of the Dutch National Allocation Plan of the European
Emission Trading System, the Dutch NOx Emission Trading System and are also
underlying the PSR-Emission Trading System presented in Fig. 3.92
The Dutch National Allocation Plan93 (Dutch NAP) allows for a sector-specific
correction factor, which takes into account the relative energy efficiency of installations.
Government intends to encourage operators to further improve their already notable
technology and to attain world best practice standards by means of the so-called
benchmarking covenants schemes.94 Besides the relative energy efficiency, historic
emission data (base period 2001–2002) and sector growth (2003–2006) as well as an
overall correction factor ensuring compliance with the emission ceiling, are variables in
the allocation formula. Thus, the Dutch NAP can be viewed to combine elements of the
grandfathering allocation with the relative standard base allocation mechanism.
Research into both the importance and the effectiveness of the relative standard base
element in the Dutch NAP and the emission development under the covenant
benchmarking system can generate interesting insights as to how industry would operate
in the absence of a strict per-firm cap. It should be noted however, that the Dutch NAP has
specific quantities allocated for the industry which—depending on society’s prefer-
ences—may be altered with regard to other CO2 emitting sectors or the tax payer.
While the Dutch NAP represents a hybrid form of allocation mechanisms, the
mechanism applied in the Dutch NOx trading system is generic in nature. The
Netherlands intends to introduce a relative standard base system,95 and, more
precisely, a PSR-System96 for emitters of NOx gases. There are four reasons why the
Dutch government opted for relative standards. First, the high emission reductions,
second, the strong differences in NOx efficiency between operators in the same
industry, third, compatibility of the relative standard with existing legislation,
91 How grandfathering schemes compare to relative standard base allocation systems (discussed below)
has to be determined on a case by case basis.
92 The particularities of the PSR system will be discussed below.
93 The Netherlands (2004a).
94 The Netherlands (2004a, p. 17 and p. 20). The Dutch government has decided to reward energy-
efficiency performance with the allocation of allowances and to prevent infliction of punishments on first
movers. More than 80% of total industrial energy use is now covered by covenants. In exchange for
compliance with the covenant plans, Government has promised not to impose further national measures
on participating businesses, which are directed towards CO2 reductions. See also The Netherlands,
(2004b).
95 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2004, p. 4 ff).
96 VROM (2003, p. 17).
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fourth, that the relative standard does not impede growth of firms since they are not
required to buy additional emission allowances when their production increases.97
Whether such a ‘‘provision’’ system98 is allocatively efficient is, however,
subject to the same reservations as the above-mentioned free allocation mecha-
nisms. Because emission allowances are created free of charge, politicians will have
to estimate abatement cost structures and industry abatement potential in order to
ensure a welfare maximizing allocation. This is equally difficult to attain as under a
grandfathering system but similarly not a problem if the trading system functions
effectively. In this case an allocative efficient solution will result if transaction costs
are zero. Yet as was the case under grandfathering, the likely hood that a PSR
system will give rise to the overall general equilibrium is low.
With regard to grandfathering, relative performance base allocation mechanisms
have the important normative advantage that ‘‘early movers’’ will automatically be
rewarded for having invested in abatement technology. Furthermore, in the presence
of upward sloping abatement cost curves ‘‘early movers’’ will have an above
average valuation for CO2 allowances if compared to firms in a grandfathering
system. In such environments relative performance allocation mechanisms are
allocatively superior to grandfathering systems.
4.3 Environmental aspects
A major objective of Emission Trading Systems is the creation of incentives for
operators to apply environmentally friendly means of production. With respect to
the European Emission Trading System, it is clear that a cap-and-trade system is
intended,99 which in effect strives to restrict the absolute amount of CO2 emissions
to prescribed levels. Operators who are not able to surrender CO2 allowances for all
their emissions on every 30th of April are subject to an excess emission penalty and
to the obligation to surrender them in the following year.100
In a trading system, emission reduction is achieved by those operators who’s
marginal abatement cost is less than, or equal to, the emission allowance market
price. It is thus the scarcity of the CO2 emission allowances that inflates the
market price of CO2 allowances and that eventually determines which firms will
be selling and which firms will be buying allowances on the market. From an
environmental point of view, it is irrelevant which firms emit CO2 but decisive
how the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere changes. CO2 concentration and
97 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2004, p. 5 ff).
98 As explained in Sect. 2.3 of this paper, emission allowances under the PSR system are created by an
administrative act based on relative standard bases for specific industries but are not transferred from the
government to enterprises. Therefore they are ‘‘provided’’ but not allocated.
99 Articles 3(1) and 3(2), in conjunction with Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, impose a specified absolute
emission target upon Member States. Even though ‘‘the cap’’ is not explicitly introduced in Directive
2003/87EC, it can be inferred from Article 11(1) requiring Member States to decide upon the total
quantity of allowances they will allocate during the three-year period to the operators of each installation.
Although it is not explicitly stated in the Directive, it is a general assumption that Member States impose
specific absolute emission caps on industries.
100 Article 16 (3) and 16(4) of Directive 2003/87EC.
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hence environmental performance is dependent on the absolute number of
emission allowances and the timing of emissions brought into circulation and
independent on their particular market price. Therefore it can be concluded that all
initial allocation mechanisms operating under an absolute annual emission cap are
logically separable from environmental effectiveness considerations. The absolute
amount of environmental allowances is exogenously determined and is thus not
influenced by such allocation mechanisms. This dichotomy can be seen in Fig. 3,
which clearly distinguishes between the Quantity Setting decision and Allowance
Allocation Mechanisms.
With respect to the operation of abatement, there are some subtle differences
between the initial allocation mechanisms, which do not, however, give rise to
different environmental effects. In auction systems, market operators will monitor
allowance prices and decide on the spot if they buy CO2 allowances or if they
commit themselves to install abatement technology. Similarly with regard to
financial administrative allocation mechanisms, the decision to buy or sell emission
allowances is determined by the market price. Similarly, with regard to free
allocation mechanisms such as grandfathering, firms will decide on the basis of the
market price and their CO2 abatement cost structure to buy or sell emission
allowances and to install abatement technology. In allocation mechanisms based on
relative industry standards, firms are awarded or provided with allocation permits on
the basis of their relative CO2 production efficiency but the decision to use them or
to sell them does also depend on the market price.
Allocation mechanisms applying a ‘‘relative standards base’’ do merit further
attention. Such allocation mechanisms do form part of the PSR-Emission Trading
System, which expressly operates in the absence of a cap.
In the Dutch NOx trading system, allowances are created on the basis of relative
industry standards and government requires firms to submit additional emission
allowance if they do not fulfil the ‘‘best practice’’ NOx efficiency standards per
produced unit. This places environmentally minded ‘‘early movers’’ at a
comparative advantage with respect to those operators which have not been willing
to invest in abatement technology.
The Dutch NOx Emission Trading System combines both, a ‘‘relative standard
base’’ benchmark system that provides emission credits by reference to the actual
emissions of the operator, with a trading system that operates in the absence of a
direct cap for national industry and is therefore referred to as a PSR System.101
The Dutch NOx trading system, which only extends to industrial operators, does
not have a direct emission cap. The overall amount of Dutch national NOx
emission and thus environmental effectiveness is theoretically safeguarded by the
Dutch ratification of the Gothenburg Protocol.102 The Netherlands have agreed to
restrict themselves to a maximum NOx emission of 266 kton in 2010, and in
accordance with the NEC directive103 committed themselves to reduce this
amount even further to 260 kton. In accordance with society’s preferences
101 VROM (2003, p. 17).
102 The Gothenburg Protocol was signed in 1999 and will enter into force on 17 May 2005.
103 Directive 2001/81/EC.
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emission reduction measures can be allocated to the sectors concerned; however, a
nation-wide emissions trading system which includes every NOx polluter has not
been established by law.104
If society decides not to expand the allowances of the NOx Emission Trading
System, also and in particular in the presence of increasing industry output, one
may speak of a de facto emission cap. This will highlight the essential
positionality105 of environmental protection standards. Thereby an environmen-
tally beneficial ‘‘race for top environmental standards’’ is created. Whenever the
Dutch government determines that the overall use of emission allowances of a
particular industry is sufficiently close to the maximum amount allocated to it, it
will sharpen environmental-friendly production standards to create incentives for
firms to invest in abatement technology. Thus with regard to the Dutch NOx
trading system, it can be concluded that environmental effectiveness, measured in
terms of NOx emissions produced within one country,
106 can be ensured by a
fixed amount of emission allowances on national level without setting a precise
cap for industry.107
The above discussion has shown that allocation mechanisms cannot influence
the environmental effectiveness of Emission Trading Systems because allocation
mechanisms are charged with the task to bring an externally determined and
prescribed amount of emission allowances onto the market. Reservations,
however, do arise when allocation mechanisms are combined with ‘‘relative
Performance Standard Rate’’ trading systems, which are not subject to any form
of cap.
Here the absolute amount of emission allowances in circulation and hence the
overall amount of emission can vary with respect to the total output of the economy.
Whether a lowering of the social marginal costs of CO2 emissions in Europe can tip
the balance towards a conscious and normative preference of additional economic
output is not only subject to societal preferences but also a question of both legal
and economic considerations.
Whether a relative Performance Standard Rate system can work in parallel with a
cap and trade system, its potential environmental and legal aspects—in particular
state aid reservations, is an interesting subject to further research.
104 The transportation sector, receiving about 60% of the emissions allocations, is expected to encounter
severe difficulties in meeting its emission target. Government will hold a security reserve to ensure
compliance with the NEC Directive and strives to maintain the sectoral distributions. VROM (2003, p. 14
and p. 29).
105 Frank (1997, p. 169) defines a ‘‘positional good’’ as ‘‘a good whose value depends strongly on how it
compares with similar goods consumed by others;...’’ and also referred to it as a ‘‘status good’’.
106 This assumption is relevant because it may be possible that as a reaction to increasing environmental
standards, production is shifted to countries with lower environmental standards. This reservation is,
however, not peculiar to the NOx system, but in fact relevant for all emission trading systems which do
place a cost burden on firms.
107 Assuming here expressly that government monitoring and action is well timed, that implementation
time of abatement technology is either immediate or that overshooting effects of excessive NOx emission




This part of the paper has outlined the importance of initial allocations in an
Emission Trading System. The comparison of various allocation mechanisms has
shown that auctions are best to solve the problems of price determination and can
thus give rise to a general equilibrium. Yet if auctions give rise to strategic
behaviour of bidders efficient transaction mechanisms are needed to ensure
allocative efficiency and the general equilibrium. Due to the inherent information
asymmetry bureaucrats cannot be expected to allocate emission allowances to
those market participants that value them the most and consequently cannot
ensure an allocative efficient distribution of emission allowances. In the presence
of efficiently operating trading markets, however, this does not pose a problem
because allocative efficiency can be ensured via market exchanges on such
markets. In all administrative allocation mechanisms normative distribution
considerations prevail over allocative efficiency and it cannot be ensured that
the resulting allocation will give rise to a general equilibrium. Whether a society
is better off under such systems strongly depends on its preferences. With regard
to free allocation mechanisms, it should be noticed that ‘‘relative standard base’’
allocation mechanisms—in accordance with the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle—
directly reward environmentally pro-active producers, while a grandfathering
system does not have the same advantage. In the presence of increasing abatement
costs ‘‘early movers’’ will have higher abatement cost structures and hence also a
higher valuation of CO2 allowances. Consequently the relative standard base
allocation mechanisms are allocatively superior to grandfathering systems in such
environments.
From an environmental perspective, the discussion in a static closed economy has
shown that the impact on the environment is dependent on the atmospheric CO2
concentration and hence the amount and timing of emissions. The amount of
allocated emissions is external to allocation mechanisms. Therefore all mechanisms
reviewed can perform equally well. It should be noted, however, that this finding
only holds as long as additional CO2 emissions generated by economic growth do
not offset positive environmental effects stemming from relative standards. In the
latter case, environmental standards would have to be strengthened in order to attain
identical emission targets.
5 Dynamic open economic setting
This section of the paper consists of three interrelated parts. The first will give an
overview of the assumptions of an open dynamic economy. The second part
examines how allocative efficiency in an open dynamic economy differs from a
static closed economy. The third addresses environmental considerations. This last
part is further divided into two sections. The first reviews variables that influences
firm’s production decision and hence the environment. The second analyses the
environmental impact of the various initial allocation schemes.
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5.1 Dynamic open economy model
After having examined allocative efficiency and environmental considerations in a
static closed environment, some of the underlying assumptions are relaxed. We stop
assuming that the world consists of only one economy but allow for international
exchanges. An open economy allows for international trade through both import and
exports. Examination of an open economy, particularly of a dynamic one, is
important because it allows the analysis of firm’s reaction to initial allocation
mechanisms. Since the focal point of interest is the allocative efficiency and its
environmental impacts of initial allocation mechanisms, Joint Implementation
Mechanisms,108 Clean Development Mechanisms,109 economic growth and demand
issues will not be discussed here. The model allows for strategic firm reactions to
the implementation of an emissions trading system such as the European ETS.
Firms can react to the introduction of such systems by reducing output, investment
in abatement technology and by shifting production abroad. The model expressly
assumes that foreign environmental requirements are negligible or non-existent and
that the only relevant variables influencing firms’ relocation decisions are transport
costs and profit opportunities abroad.
5.2 Comparison of allocation mechanisms and allocative efficiency
Having introduced the dynamic open economy model, the next section will provide
a comparison of initial allocation mechanisms. In particular, the differences to the
static closed economy model are emphasised. This section consists of two parts. The
first addresses auctions while the second deals with financial and free initial
allocation mechanisms, including grandfathering and ‘‘relative standard base’’
systems.
5.2.1 Auctions as an allocation mechanism
The findings made in a dynamic open economy are very similar to those made in the
static closed economic model discussed earlier. There are, however a number of
additions which need to be addressed. At first collusion will be treated. Thereafter
declining price anomaly is reviewed.
108 The Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism is established by the Kyoto Protocol and allows parties
listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol to receive emissions reduction units for co-financing projects that
reduce net emissions in an Annex I country. Article 30(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC contains the
possibility to incorporate JI mechanisms into the European Emissions Trading System.
109 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is established by the Kyoto Protocol (definition in
Article 12) and allows Parties listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol to finance emission-reduction
projects in countries which are not listed Annex I. Annex I parties are awarded certified emission
reductions (CERs) for doing so. The goals of the CDM are two-fold: firstly to assist non-Annex I parties
in pursuing sustainable development policies and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the
convention and secondly to assist Annex I parties in meeting their emission targets. Article 30(3) of




As presented in the static model, in-auction collusion is of particular importance
in multiunit auctions.110 Such issues as demand reduction and signalling have
already been addressed in this paper. Since the same negative effects hold true for a
dynamic environment, they will not be repeated here. There is, however, an
important addition: in a dynamic model one does not only take into account in-
auction collusion but also collusion occurring in a multi-sequential auction setting.
Repetitive interaction of bidders provides the opportunity to retaliate against non-
cooperating cartel members in later auctions.111 In the presence of market power, an
increased expected profit from collusion will distort the emission allowance market
and thus allocative efficiency. Such form of collusion is beyond the reach of auction
design theory and is dealt with in a competition law context.
Similarly, the problem of ‘‘declining price anomaly’’ which occurred only in a
sequential auction framework in the static model is exacerbated in the dynamic
economic setting. Here the temporal scope of simultaneous multiunit auctions is
cast into a number of subsequent auctions over time. Hence bidders are forced to
predict the evolution of market prices. A higher degree of uncertainty112 is
associated with demand and supply estimates in the more distant future and
expected to exacerbate the strategic complexities firms will have to deal with. The
degree of uncertainty firms are exposed to in both sequential and simultaneous
multiunit auctions is expected to be higher in a dynamic environment than in a static
one. High uncertainty may induce risk averse bidders to overbid even more in early
auctions. Consequently strong declining price anomaly distorts allocative efficiency.
If Competition law would work suboptimally and fail to contain collusion occurring
outside auctions, ceteris paribus, allocative efficiency would be worse than in a closed
static environment and the general equilibrium may not be attained. Similarly a higher
degree of uncertainty associated with larger prediction errors of forecasts is expected to
exacerbate declining price anomaly and hence negatively affect allocative efficiency and
the prospects to reach the general equilibrium in comparison to the static model. If
allocative efficiency cannot be attained through auctions, efficient secondary markets on
which bidders can cost effectively exchange emission allowances are needed.
5.2.2 Administrative allocation mechanism
After having reviewed how the allocative implications of auctions in an open
dynamic economy differ from a closed static economy, we now turn to a set of
different allocation mechanisms. Subsequently, the changes of both financial
administrative and free administrative allocation mechanisms with regard to the
dynamic model will be analysed. Allocative efficiency is the relevant criterion.
Financial administrative allocation mechanisms. The allocative effects of a
financial administrative allocation mechanism are dependent on its particularities,
but some general aspects can be highlighted. As in the static model, allocative
efficiency is expected to be suboptimal and the general equilibrium may not be
110 Salmon (2003, p. 10).
111 See Martin (1994, p. 163).
112 See Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2005).
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attained because bureaucrats will normally not be fully informed about the needs of
operators nor are entrepreneurs willing to reveal their true preferences.
Due to societal considerations, a financial administrative allocation mechanism
can be created to cross-subsidise specific operators. Through the granting of more
favourable prices, operators can be awarded windfall profits.113 Independent of
initial allocation, profit-maximizing firms will take the opportunity costs114 of the
awarded emission allowances into account and rationally decide to use or to sell
them. Therefore the same finding as in the static model prevails: efficient secondary
markets have to ensure efficient allocation of emission allowances.
Free administrative allocation mechanisms. Unlike auctions or financial
allocation mechanisms, free administrative allocation mechanisms do not require
payments for emission allowances. As in the static economy, in a dynamic one the
normative distribution justifications routed in societal preferences or industrial
policy prevail over allocative efficiency and general equilibrium considerations.
Allocative efficiency is subject to the same reservations concerning leakages and
transaction costs as presented in the static environment and has to be ensured on
secondary allowance markets. Below two particular forms of free administrative
initial allocation mechanisms are being discussed: (a) grandfathering, and (b)
relative standard base initial allocation systems.
(a) Grandfathering. As already outlined in the static model, grandfathering
systems cannot be expected to generate an allocatively efficient initial distribution
of emission allowances and may not lead to the attainment of the general
equilibrium. As in the static environment, grandfathering in the dynamic environ-
ment can be allocatively superior to other free administrative allocation mechanisms
because the former distributes allowances to a set of market operators who can be
expected to have a high valuation for emission allowances. Given, however, that
grandfathering is based on historic emissions and not on abatement cost structures,
this allocation mechanism will always be less efficient than auction models.
(b) Relative standard base mechanisms. Similarly to other free allocation
mechanisms, the relative standard base systems, including the PSR system, are not
allocatively efficient and may not give rise to a general equilibrium. This is because
emission allowances are allocated for free, leaving politicians to estimate abatement
cost structures and industry abatement potential in order to ensure a welfare
maximizing allocation. This is as difficult to achieve as under a grandfathering
system and can only be remedied via an effectively functioning Emission Trading
System. As already indicated in the static economic model, ‘‘early movers’’ are
rewarded for investing in abatement technology. If ‘‘early movers’’ have higher
abatement cost structures,115 a relative standard base allocation system will not only
be more allocatively efficient but also be in line with the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle.
The finding of the closed static economy model is thus repeated.
113 Windfall profits are unexpected profits that accrue to the recipient and are beyond his control. Such
windfall profits may give rise to State aid considerations under Art. 87 EC Treaty.
114 Opportunity costs are commonly understood as the cost of something measured in terms of the benefit
forgone by not using it for a different purpose.
115 This will be the case in the presence of an increasing abatement cost curve.
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This section has generated the results analogous to those in the closed static
economy setting. Free administrative allocation systems are not allocatively
efficient because bureaucrats are unable to award those market participants who
have the highest valuation with emission allowances and may not give rise to a
general equilibrium allocation. In the presence of upward sloping abatement cost
curves, however, relative standard base allocation systems are allocatively superior
to grandfathering systems and in conformity with the polluter pays principle.
5.3 Environmental aspects
This part consists of two sections. The first reviews variables that influence firms’
production decisions and hence the environment. Subsequently the environmental
impact of the various initial allocation schemes is analysed.
5.3.1 Dynamic interaction of firms and the environment
This part of the paper describes the complex interaction of an open economy in
which emission allowances are introduced. Here it is assumed that from an
environmental point of view it is irrelevant where in the world CO2 emissions are
reduced. Unlike in a static model, a dynamic setting allows for strategic firm
behaviour and the adaptation to its business environment.
Due to the liberalisation of international investment flows and the advances in
transportation and communication, capital has become more mobile than ever before.
In the 1990s globalisation intensified when firms engaged in stronger vertical
disintegration of production processes through outsourcing and process fragmenta-
tion. The ratio of global trade in goods and commercial services to world GDP has
increased strongly from 8% in the 1950s to 19.8% in 1990. In the few years till 2002
this ratio increased by another 10%.116 An important motivation underlying
globalisation is the desire to benefit from international price differentials of production
inputs.117
Rising environmental standards will increase production costs and lower the rate
of return on domestic capital, leading to a reduction of the competitive edge of
production sites and thus eventually to capital outflows. This in turn will impact
private income and government’s ability to finance its expenditure via taxes. At
present the knowledge on the direction and magnitude of the interdependences
between environmental cost internalisation and international competitiveness is
limited.118 Therefore the following discussion is restricted to a theoretical review of
relevant strategic implications of firm behaviour.
As already presented in this paper, the economic intuition behind emission
trading is the internalisation of negative externalities. Incentives to produce in a
socially and environmentally desirable way are created via the market-price
116 See Van den Bossche (2005, p. 8).
117 Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Ethier (2002) for detailed discussions.
118 Alanen (2003, p. 1112).
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mechanism by increasing costs of production. In the following a firm’s profit
maximizing reaction to increases in production costs and its associated environ-
mental implications are reviewed.
The obligation to submit allowances on a predetermined date in accordance with
specified criteria can entail budgetary consequences for operators. Whether these
consequences will be positive or negative depends on CO2 abatement costs, the
prevailing market price of emission allowances, operating costs and stranded
costs.119
Budgetary impacts will be positive if the market price of emission allowances
exceeds the cost of CO2 abatement to such a degree that an operator is able to
profitably sell emission allowances on the market. Positive effects of emission
trading are enhanced by mitigating the impact on operating costs by saving on
expensive CO2 intensive energy consumption.
120 There will also be a positive (or
less negative) budgetary effect if an operator receives part of the needed CO2
emission allowances for free or below their true market value. This is generally
referred to as windfall profit.
On average, however, negative budgetary implications are to be expected, given
the environmental objective of reducing anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Besides the
direct costs of emission allowances, administrative and operative costs are non-
negligible. In addition to these costs, firms will incur accounting losses if existing
investments will be rendered unprofitable through increases in variable operating
costs. These costs are referred to as stranded costs. Particularly energy and thus CO2
intensive sectors will be subject to considerable increases in production costs and
may not be able to withstand competitive pressure.121
The above discussion shows that an important determinant to induce behavioural
change of operators is to increase their production costs. Whether the introduction
of a regional Emission Trading System such as the European Emissions Trading
System will indeed lead to the intended reduction of global CO2 emissions, is a
different issue. Profit maximizing operators can reduce CO2 emissions within the
economy by investing in abatement technology, or by reducing production output.
This is precisely the same finding as was discovered in the static setting. Allowing
for dynamic interaction, however, one should also note the strategic reaction of
firms. Firms have two options. First, they can outsource abatement or secondly they
can outsource production. Each will be treated in turn.
Firstly, in an open dynamic economy such as the one of the European Union, firms
can ‘‘outsource’’ CO2 abatement. This can be done via Joint Implementation
122 and
119 Existing investments which are rendered unprofitable due to the introduction of environmental
regulations are commonly referred to as stranded costs.
120 Fossil energy sources are particularly rich in CO2.
121 For a recent study addressing this issue see Reinaud (2005).
122 The Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism is established by the Kyoto Protocol and allows parties
listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol to receive emissions reduction units for co-financing projects that
reduce net emissions in an Annex B country. Article 30(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC contains the
possibility to incorporate JI mechanisms into the European Emissions Trading System.
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Clean Development Mechanisms.123 Both mechanisms allow firms to benefit from
lower abatement costs abroad. This in turn mitigates the cost burden placed upon
domestic firms and hence the pressure to rely upon other means to contain CO2
emission. Critics argue that this may create significant leakage and thus is not
desirable from an environmental point of view. It should, however, also be noted that
a lowering in the abatement cost structure enables operators to produce within the
domestic economy and avoid additional CO2 emissions associated with a shifting of
production abroad.124
Second, in an open dynamic economy firms can outsource production. A
restriction of CO2 emissions in one region can lead to increases in production costs
which trigger changes in relative prices and shifts in trade patterns which work to
offset positive CO2 reductions.
125 The mere suspicion that higher production costs
may reduce profitability may lead to a redirection of investments ex ante, i.e. before
the introduction of cost internalisation measures. It will, however, certainly lead to a
redirection of future investments.
The profitability and hence occurrence of such outsourcing and the redirection of
trade flows depends on transportation costs and profits reaped on the foreign
market.126 If it is more profitable to produce in the absence of any environmental
cost internalisation measures abroad and to serve the foreign and domestic market at
the same time by shipping goods to the EU, profit maximizing firms will do so in the
long run. Particularly so if growth prospects are more favourable abroad and
transportation costs are expected to be declining over time. Production relocation
would entail an increase of CO2 emissions abroad with potential negative effects for
the environment. Not only would the apparent EU emission be understating its true
CO2 consumption, but ceteris paribus even lead to a rise in CO2 emissions due to an
increase in the average transportation distance of goods marketed in the EU. This
negative impact on global CO2 emissions would be exacerbated if foreign producers
used more carbon intensive production techniques.
This section has shown that the introduction of an Emission Trading System can
have significant distributional effects for particular firms. These can be exacerbated
or mitigated through the selection of an initial allocation mechanism. Allowing the
procurement of CO2 abatement abroad lowers the overall cost burden on enterprises
and permits domestic firms to continue their operations. Distributional effects within
123 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is established by the Kyoto Protocol (definition in
Article 12) and allows Parties listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol to finance emission-reduction
projects in countries which are not listed Annex B. Annex B parties are awarded certified emission
reductions (CERs) for doing so. The goals of the CDM are two-fold: firstly to assist non-Annex B parties
in pursuing sustainable development policies and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the
convention and secondly to assist Annex B parties in meeting their emission targets. Article 30(3) of
Directive 2003/87/EC contains the possibility to incorporate CDM mechanisms into the European
Emissions Trading System.
124 See discussion below.
125 Such effects have long been addressed in multi-regional studies. See for example Pezzy (1992),
Edmonds et al. (1995), Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000) and Munskgaard and Pedersen (2001).
126 In reality there are of course other political and socio-economic factors taken into account before a
production decision is taken. For the sake of simplicity, only transportation costs and profit opportunities
on the foreign market are taken into account.
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the domestic market as such do not induce firms to relocate. The decisive factor for
relocation and the generation of associated negative environmental effects is the
existence of a cost differential between environmental cost internalisation on one
hand and transportation costs on the other. Profit opportunities in foreign markets
are also taken into account and counterbalance high transportation costs. Positive
predictions of the evolution of transportation costs and profits earned abroad and
dim prospects of permit prices can tip the balance towards relocation decisions.
5.3.2 Initial allocation mechanisms and the environment
After having reviewed general firm behaviour that can be triggered by production
cost increases due to the introduction of an Emission Trading System, the following
section reviews qualitative environmental differences stemming from the selection
of different initial allocation mechanisms. Systems considered include auctions,
financial administrative allocation systems as well as free administrative allocation
systems. Here particular attention is devoted to grandfathering and relative
standards.
Auctions. Unlike in the static closed economy setting, auction mechanisms
used in an open economy are capable of impacting the environment. Due to the
mere fact that in auctions CO2 emission allowances are sold, auctions do
generate the strongest distributional effect of all initial allocation mechanisms.
The cost burden placed upon firms will lead to a reduction in CO2 due to
investment in abatement technology and the reduction of output to a socially
desirable level. From an environmental point of view the critical element is the
change in the production decision. The reduction on the rate of return of
domestic capital can trigger the relocation of domestic production plants and lead
to a rise in CO2 emissions. This will be the case if an increase in transportation
distance of goods is associated with more CO2 emissions and if production
abroad is more CO2 intensive.
One interesting opportunity provided by auction systems is that they generate
government funds in a non-distortionary manner. These funds can be channelled
back to operators. Investment shifts will not occur if the collected funds are
redistributed in form of tax cuts in such a way as to fully compensate operators for
the expenses they incur.127
If funds are distributed via tax cuts to other groups of society, an increase in
disposable income will lead to an increase in demand and hence to more overall
world emissions. This will particularly be the case if foreign direct investment
stimulates foreign economic growth and profitable business opportunities in the host
country.
The threat of the occurrence of declining price anomaly and collusion will distort
the equilibrium market price. The declining price anomaly gives rise to an
127 The substitution of distortionary taxes on labour or profit could be substituted by the levy of non-
distortionary taxes on CO2 emissions. Ballard et al. (1985) estimate that one dollar raised through
distortionary taxes can cost society one dollar 30 cents. Thus society, including operators, can be made




overshooting effect in the sense that the market price will at the beginning lie above
its true equilibrium. This could, however, lead to short run overinvestment in
abatement technology. Such positive environmental effects, may be partially
depleted during the price adjustment towards its true equilibrium. Collusion will not
lead to an overstatement but to an understatement of bidder’s true valuations. This
leads to adverse environmental effects to the extent that the lower market price for
emission allowances gives rise to suboptimal investments in abatement technology
and increased market penetration of foreign competitors.
Administrative allocation mechanisms. After having reviewed the environmental
impact of auction mechanisms, this section reviews the impact of administrative
allocation mechanisms on firm behaviour and consequently, its impacts on CO2
emissions. First financial administrative allocation mechanisms are being reviewed.
Subsequently free administrative mechanisms, including grandfathering and relative
standard base mechanisms are examined.
(1) Financial administrative allocation mechanisms. As already indicated,
environmental effectiveness in a dynamic open economy does not only depend on
the absolute emission cap but also on how operators adapt to changes in their
business environment. Emission reduction in a trading system is only achieved by
inducing operators to take externalities into account. This is achieved by inflating
the price of an earlier under-priced good.
Even profit maximizing operators who have been awarded windfall profits under
a financial administrative allocation mechanism have every incentive to reduce
emission if their production costs with regard to CO2 increased. This leads to a
reduction in output, an increase in CO2 efficiency or to a transfer of production
abroad. If transportation costs are sufficiently low as to allow a firm to produce
abroad and import goods at a profit, a profit maximizing operator has every
incentive to do so. This is rational behaviour irrespective of any windfall profits,
which are granted to particular operators or sectors. This may lead to a furtherance
of the wedge between CO2 production and CO2 consumption within the EU.
(2) Free administrative allocation mechanisms. Similarly, even in the case where
all emission allowances are distributed for free, overall scarcity is determined by the
quantity supplied. Since in all cases reviewed the initially allocated amount is
assumed to be the same, the degree of scarcity and hence also the prevailing market
price will be the same. Firm’s strategic reaction to the introduction of emission
allowances is similarly dependent upon transportation costs and expected profits
from abroad. Since the actual costs incurred by operators are lower than under
auction and financial administrative allocation mechanisms, ceteris paribus, less
relocation will occur.
(a) Grandfathering. Free allocation based on historical input, output or
emission data gives rise to strategic firm behaviour. Overall CO2 emission will
depend on the market price of emission allowances, abatement costs, transpor-
tation costs and expected profits abroad. If it is profitable firms will shift
production sites abroad and prefer to import rather than to produce within the
EU. This entails negative environmental consequences. Grandfathering, however,
differs from other free allocation mechanisms because it gives rise to additional
strategic firm behaviour. Before the base year is being set, firms do have every
CO2 emission allowance allocation mechanisms 63
123
incentive to emit more CO2 and to postpone emission reduction programs in
order to increase their future allocation. How such negative environmental effects
compare to other allocation mechanisms is subject to further research but it
appears clear that grandfathering based on actual historic emissions is less
preferable than free allocation mechanisms based on e.g. market share, which do
not give rise to such self-defeating incentives.
(b) Relative standard base mechanisms. As has been shown in the static economy
setting, a relative standard base allocation system can be applied to attain a
predetermined emission cap provided that the industry standards are adjusted in
accordance to increases in production. The costs accruing to particular operators are
expected to reflect their abatement possibilities. Therefore the threat that existing
investments will be transformed into stranded costs appears to be lower. Similarly,
if transportation costs and potentially higher monitoring costs128 were indirectly
taken into account by assessing an industry’s competitive position, relocation will
be limited and consequently, environmental effects will be limited. This will,
however, only be the case if monitoring costs are sufficiently low and uncertainty
about bureaucratic action to raise prevailing environmental standards to maintain
the CO2 cap are not such as to induce firms to relocate. Since PSR systems reward
early movers, they penalise late movers. This creates the danger that if standards are
set too high, late movers bearing the relatively higher costs will have stronger
incentives to relocate. Whether relocation can be limited through the introduction of
relative standards that can contain adverse global CO2 effects depends not only on
the standard setting institution’s ability to determine abatement capabilities but also
on the stringency of the selected emission cap. If the abatement target is so large as
to exhaust all possibilities to burden domestic industry, relocation will necessarily
take place.
In the absence of a fixed emission cap, it is argued that CO2 emission will rise
more than under an absolute emission cap. While this is a valid reservation under
a closed economy setting if decision makers are inclined to follow social
considerations and lobbyists not to increase relative standards, this is not so
evident in an dynamic open economy. Here, similarly, the reservations regarding
decision makers’ determination to adhere to goals committed to under
international treaties are valid. Independent of the decision maker’s resolution
to contain CO2 emissions, feasibility of CO2 abatement is determined by profit
opportunities abroad and transportation costs. Firms who can operate more
profitably in a country which does not internalise negative externalities and still
sell products in the domestic economy, will do so. The only means for the
domestic economy to push internalisation of externalities beyond the level of
transportation costs is to shift existing taxation away from current tax sources129
128 Gielen et al. (2002, p. 11) assert that monitoring costs for particular industries under a relative
standard base mechanism will be higher if no existing relative standards can be referred to.
129 One could think about increasing the tax burden on CO2 while reducing the taxation for labour by an
equal amount so that it is rational for firms to adjust to the new taxation rules by reducing the amount of
CO2 emission without having incentives to relocate production facilities.
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or to levy an import tax130 to take the differences in CO2 intensity of production
attributable to particular goods131 into account.
5.4 Summary
This part of the paper has shown that allocative efficiency, and potentially also the
general equilibrium, are more difficult to attain in an open economy. Allocative
efficiency of auctions in a dynamic setting is complicated by collusion occurring
outside the auctions and can only be contained via the application of Competition
law. Similarly a higher degree of uncertainty associated with larger prediction errors
of forecasts is expected to exacerbate declining price anomaly and hence negatively
affect allocative efficiency. If allocative efficiency cannot be attained through
auctions, efficient secondary markets are needed. As in the static closed economy
model, allocative efficiency cannot be attained via administrative distribution
systems, which emphasise normative distribution considerations. Efficiently oper-
ating secondary markets allow operators to realise the windfall profits they have
been awarded via financial or free administrative allocation mechanisms. In the
presence of upward sloping abatement cost curves, however, relative standard base
allocation systems are allocatively superior to grandfathering systems and in
conformity with the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle. Thus the finding made with respect
to the static model has been confirmed.
In a dynamic model firm’s reactions to an increase in production prices has an
important bearing on the environment. The decisive factor for international
competitiveness and the decision to relocate production and the generation of
associated negative environmental effects is the existence of a cost differential
between environmental cost internalisation on one hand and transportation costs on
the other. Profit opportunities in foreign markets are also taken into account and
counterbalance high transportation costs. Positive predictions of the evolution of
transportation costs and profits earned abroad and dim prospects of permit prices
can tip the balance towards relocation decisions.
Distributional impacts on particular firms can be exacerbated or mitigated
through the selection of an initial allocation mechanism. Auctions generate the
strongest cost burden on particular firms and thus also the strongest incentives for
firms to relocate if the funds that are levied in a non-distortionary manner are not
redistributed to bidders. If other parts of society are awarded parts of the funds, it
can be expected that an increase in disposable money will lead to increased demand
and CO2 emissions. While collusion will not generate adverse environmental
effects, declining price anomaly may lead to a temporary overinvestment in
abatement technology. The cost burden placed upon firms is less severe under a
130 Import taxes serve to protect producers’ surplus at the expense of consumers’ surplus. While the
overall social welfare effect is ambiguous, it is assumed to be lower for small economies. See Krugman
and Obstfeld (1997, p. 193 ff).
131 An ‘‘import tax’’ is the same as an import tariff, or customs duty. Tariffs on most products are bound
in the schedules of the WTO Members. Unilateral increases in tariffs are generally a violation of WTO
law (Article II GATT) and are permitted only in certain very restricted cases (e.g. anti-dumping,
countervailing, safeguards).
CO2 emission allowance allocation mechanisms 65
123
financial administrative allocation mechanism than under auctions since permits are
assumed to be marketed below their true market price. Free administrative
allocation systems place the lowest direct cost burden on enterprises and thus
generate the least incentive for firms to engage in environmentally unfriendly
production relocation. Yet it should be noticed that grandfathering systems can
induce operators to postpone emission reduction projects in order to be awarded
more emission allowances. Such incentives are not present for relative standard base
mechanisms. In addition stranded costs are expected to be limited. Under a cap and
trade system—or in case of its absence if a given emission quantity is observed—
and assuming that the set relative standards take into account abatement costs and
industry’s competitive position, and that monitoring costs and uncertainty costs are
limited, relative standard base systems can perform in the most environmentally
efficient manner.
In a dynamic open economy the upper boundary for the internalisation of
environmental externalities is dependent upon the international competitive position
of domestic firms and not determined by domestic regulation prescribing absolute
emission targets. In such cases the existence of a cap or its absence is not of
practical relevance since this differentiation does not affect firm’s production
decisions. Hence, both from an environmental and competitiveness point of view
the most cost effective system is most desirable. Depending on the particular
mechanism design, this might be a relative standard base system, which may be an
element of a PSR Emission Trading System.
6 Conclusion
This paper has placed various initial CO2 emission allocation mechanisms into a
typology and analysed them within a static closed and a dynamic open economy
setting according to their price determination and allocative efficiency in order to
determine if the EU ETS promotes or hinders allocative efficiency and whether
allocative efficiency can be safeguarded. In light of the overall objective of the
Emission Trading System, particular attention has been given to environmental
aspects of allocation mechanisms.
With regard to the static closed economy the chapter shows that only auctions
are capable to solve the problem of price determination and to attain allocative
efficiency and the general equilibrium. In the presence of collusion or declining
price anomaly, however, they have to rely upon efficient secondary markets for
the attainment of these goals. It is however not certain if a general equilibrium
will result. Since in administrative allocation mechanisms normative distribution
considerations prevail over allocative efficiency, they too have to depend upon
efficient secondary markets to ensure allocative efficiency and still may fail to
ensure a general equilibrium. Relative standard base mechanisms award ‘‘early
movers’’ in accordance to the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle and thus are allocatively
superior to grandfathering schemes. Relaxing the strict model assumptions
towards a dynamic open economy confirms the above findings with only one
qualification. Due to an exacerbated risk of collusion and a declining price
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anomaly due to a larger degree of uncertainty, auctions perform less well in the
dynamic closed economy than in a static closed economy. Therefore it can be
concluded that only the auctioning mechanism is capable of ensuring allocative
efficiency with general equilibrium characteristics and that the other allocation
formats that can be applied under the EU ETS do rely on cost effective exchange
systems to safeguard allocative efficiency.
With regard to environmental aspects, initial allocation mechanisms under a
static closed economy are unable to affect the environment as long as a strict
dichotomy between the quantity setting decision and the distribution issue of CO2
prevails. This, however, is not the case for a dynamic open economy setting. The
introduction of an emission allowance trading system increases production costs of
operators. In the framework considered transportation costs and profit opportunities
abroad constitute the upper limit of the internalisation of negative environmental
externalities because operators may relocate production facilities abroad if it is
profitable for them to do so. Global CO2 emission will rise due to relocation if the
average transportation distance increases132 or if production abroad is not subject to
equivalent environmental regulations.
In the absence of compensation schemes auctions generate the highest burden on
operators and thus perform worst from an environmental perspective. Its perfor-
mance may only partially be mitigated by short-term positive environmental effects
stemming from declining price anomaly. The relocation-inducing burden under
financial administrative systems is less severe than under auctions but not as low as
under free administrative allocation systems. Due to the non-existence of time
shifting incentives and low stranded costs, relative standard base systems are more
environmentally friendly than grandfathering mechanisms. This will be the case in a
cap and trade system as well as in the absence of a cap as long as the overall
emission quantity is not increased provided that standards are set in such a way as to
take abatement costs and industry’s competitive position into account and that
monitoring costs and uncertainty costs are sufficiently low. Irrespective of the
existence of an emission cap, the upper limit of the costs to the internalisation of
environmental costs is given by operator’s ability to evade such costs. Therefore it
can be concluded that indeed initial allocation mechanisms have a bearing on the
environment and that its impact may even be more relevant than the discussion of
the necessity of emission caps may suggest.
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